I like to read, but I find that if you ask me about a book anywhere from 3 to 12 months after finishing it, I am apt to remember little in the way of insights or important conclusions. Maybe my mind is simply going to mush with age. Thus, if for nothing else, this blog has served its purpose as the place where I can memorialize my initial reactions and big takeaways from the literature on my self-created "syllabus". Three more from late 2011/2012...
-There's Always Something to Do by Christopher Risso-Gill. The story of Peter Cundill, nicknamed the Canadian Warren Buffett for both his investing success and his adherence to the Benjamin Graham method. Nothing remarkable about the book, but it briefly mentions one of his interesting tactics: each year Cundill would visit the country that had the worst performing stock market over the prior 12 months, searching for opportunities.
-Hot Commodities by Jim Rogers. I probably would've found this book more interesting had I read when it first came out in the mid 2000s. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note how lukewarm Rogers is about gold at the time (versus his attitude now).
-Economics and the Public Welfare by Benjamin Anderson. A financial history book for the period 1914-1946 based on the observations of one of the key players of the time (chief economist at Chase). Generally, I am receptive to writing that deals with the depression of 1921, as it is often viewed as a compelling example of a deep slump that resolved itself rather quickly in spite of minimal government intervention. So what does Anderson (who was neither Austrian nor Keynesian) have to say? He points out that government expenditures from 1920-1923 went down every year (albeit from a higher base following the war) and that taxes were lowered slightly, with the result a net surplus from 1921 to 1923 (i.e., no deficit financing). Wages declined slightly and production lowered dramatically between 1920 and 1922 -- in other words, there was no stimulus to prop up prices. The markets were allowed to clear and the recovery was quick. He contrasts it with Japan, where there was coordinated effort between central bankers, politicians, and industry to prevent prices from dropping, followed by a 7-year period of stagnation, and then a banking crisis. Also of interest to me, the book looks at some of the data that has been argued by certain Austrian thinkers to demonstrate a credit-fueled boom in the '20s (masked by a natural period of deflation) that led to the '29 Crash -- Anderson identified a tremendous expansion in credit (sparked by easy money) which precipitated speculative behavior. Finally, the book spends a great deal of time looking at many of the New Deal policies and makes an argument that would seem to support the "Regime Uncertainty" thesis of Robert Higgs.
