Showing posts with label Bonds. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bonds. Show all posts

Thursday, January 24, 2019

Trend Changes


I revisited an interview with Harris Kupperman on Real Vision from November.  His comments on interest rates were not news (if you have been paying attention), but his delivery did a good job of succinctly clarifying the risk:

“I think the number one big-picture view right now is interest rates. If you look around the world, every currency, every yield curve, every duration component, they're all breaking out. There's a 30-year chart in the US it just broke out of. You look at shorter term charts, there are basically inverse head and shoulders everywhere. It's all breaking out.

And when you have so many different breakouts at the same time, it's probably a trend change. Interest rates go in generational cycles, 30-year cycles, and we just ended a 30-year cycle. No one in the markets right now, or almost no one, has invested during a time when rates go up. They've only seen rates go down.

I think you're going to see a huge change in what's happening in the markets. When rates go up, the value of everything else, every asset goes down because it's all value on cash flows. At the same time, cash flows go down because interest rate coverage goes up.

And I think you to see a loss situation where companies today look conservatively leveraged at 100 and 200 basis points more interest rate will actually lead to them being highly leveraged from a cash flow coverage side, that buybacks and dividends are going to end. Debt pay down is going to begin. And I think you will see a lot situations today where you have reasonably good businesses, where two, three years from now, what's to be left is an equity sliver on the enterprise value and a huge debt component…

I think it's a lot like the '70s when rates go up and values keep going down. And increasingly cash flow goes to interest service. And you're coming at this from such low interest rates that you don't need interest rates to go to 10%, 15%. To move from 0 to 300 BPS right now is an extreme. But you have interest rate floors in place, so you haven't really seen it companies.

The move from 300 to 500 BPS, that's going to go to stretch a lot of companies. And you don't really need the rates to go up that much. And yes, I think it's going to be a dramatic repricing because right now, equities price in the future, so equities are pricing in future earnings growth often funded by buybacks. And suddenly they're going to be pricing in earnings declines as everything goes to interest coverage. And when that repricing happens, it's going to be very dramatic.”

Wednesday, February 15, 2017

More Tells

I am kind of shooting from the hip with this post, having not fully thought through potential causes, but...

In the last book that I read by Richard Koo, and really totally consistent with all the well-known Keynesians out there, there is a belief that a balance sheet recession prevents huge amounts of QE from causing inflation.  And, according to most "experts", Europe is in the midst of a balance sheet recession.  So, why then are inflation rates spiking up from Germany to Belgium to Spain?  Add to that, bond rates for weaker issuers (and I am throwing French OATs in there) are starting to flash out relative to Bunds.

I'm suspecting that what everyone thinks they know is about to be thrown on its head.

Friday, December 30, 2016

End of Year Note

I am optimistic about 2017. Not because of who got elected president, or because I think that the economy is about to heat up. Rather, it is about business prospects that I have been mining for several years which I think will finally evolve and mature to my satisfaction. Having lacked such optimism for a while, it’s a nice change.

Apropos of that sentiment, the notion that interest rates should rise will facilitate the ideas that I want to take action on. And, courtesy of 720 Global, I think the following summary explains why such a reality is likely:

“While the increasing interest rate risk and price sensitivity coupled with a decreasing margin of safety (lower coupon payments) of outstanding debt is alarming, the story is incomplete. To fully appreciate the magnitude of this issue, one must overlay those risks with the amount of debt outstanding. Since 1982, the duration (price risk) of nominal U.S. Treasury securities has risen 70% while the average coupon, or margin of safety, has dropped 85%. Meanwhile, the total amount of U.S. public federal debt has exploded higher by 1,600% and total U.S. credit market debt, as last reported by the Federal Reserve in 2015, has increased over 1,000% standing at $63.4 trillion. When contrasted with nominal GDP ($18.6 trillion), one begins to gain a sense for how radically out of balance the accumulation of debt has been relative to the size of the economy required to support and service that debt. In other words, were it not for the steady long-term decline in interest rates, this arrangement likely would have collapsed under its own weight long ago.”

To all, I wish a happy and healthy new year. I look forward to bigger and better things.

Friday, November 18, 2016

Bond Update

The move in interest rates since the election (and really since the low over the summer) has been impressive.  There are a whole host of unintended consequences if rates move higher in a world where the stock market is overvalued, economic growth is tepid, debt is in large supply already, and the spigots of fiscal policy seemed poised to be turned on under Trump.

So, with that as context, I decided to look at the charts to determine whether it is safe to say that the 35-year bull market is over.  Short answer, until the 10-year bond (as proxy for all bonds) cracks north of 3%, then the downtrend in rates remains intact.  With that said, the double bottom (hit almost exactly 4 years apart in 2012 and 2016) speaks to a potential change of course.  But, we must wait for confirmation, especially as there are plenty of smart people that I follow who are making the case for even lower rates when the next recession hits.


Monday, November 14, 2016

More Reaction

Starting with the markets. After Trump won (which wasn’t supposed to happen), the stock market made an impressive move higher (which also wasn’t supposed to happen). The interesting cross-current, though, was how much interest rates moved up as well (in another clear example of how the Fed is not bigger than the market). Part of the “explanation” is that Trump’s anti-regulation, lower tax policy stance, within the backdrop of a Republican-controlled congress, should be good for growth. But, to my thinking, stocks were already very over-valued, and the debt problem did not suddenly go away. If these immediate reactions remain the trend, and don’t reverse, higher rates will have an impact at some point. That I believe.

As for the whining post-election, I chalk it up to my favorite internet meme: “When everybody gets a trophy, nobody knows how to lose.” To be clear (for the millionth time), I am not a fan of Trump, and as much as I do not like Hillary, I still couldn’t hold my nose and vote for the guy. But, any notion that the popular vote is more indicative or important than the Electoral College outcome is just ridiculous. Everybody knew the rules going in. As a result, the candidates campaigned so as to win the Electoral College, not the popular vote. Moreover, I am not even sure that the popular vote outcome is truly informative anyway. Sure, at a minimum, it tells us that the country is highly divided, but we also know that the existence of the electoral college structure in the first place means that plenty of people think that their vote holds very little value (I live in New York City and there was no difference in the election results whether I voted Clinton, Trump or not at all). Just consider that only 53% of eligible voters participated – the non-voters actually won the election by that metric. Therefore, it’s hard to argue that the popular vote tells us anything of import. But, everybody likes to have something to complain about. And in the land of safe spaces, winning the popular vote is something to hang on to.

Tuesday, November 8, 2016

Tick Tock...

I sounded "sad" in yesterday's post, but really I am pretty sanguine about the election.  Change is going to come even if the status quo candidate wins today -- and it's going to happen because we can't escape the debt problem in this country.  So, to explore the issue a bit, I put together a table of annual U.S. fiscal deficits and the cumulative changes in total outstanding public federal debt since 1960.  I think it brings home the point.  Enjoy.


Year Deficit Public Debt Fed
1960 4.8 290.5
1961 10.5 292.7
1962 7.2 302.9
1963 4.8 310.3
1964 5.9 316.1
1965 1.4 322.3
1966 3.7 328.5
1967 8.6 340.5
1968 25.2 368.7
1969 (3.2) 365.8
1970 2.8 380.9
1971 23.0 408.2 Bye-bye gold standard…notice anything about deficits afterwards?
1972 23.4 435.9
1973 14.9 466.3
1974 6.1 483.9
1975 53.2 541.9
1976 73.7 629.0
1977 53.7 706.4
1978 59.2 776.6
1979 40.7 829.5
1980 73.8 909.0
1981 79.0 994.8
1982 128.0 1,137.3
1983 207.8 1,371.7
1984 185.4 1,564.6
1985 212.3 1,817.4
1986 221.2 2,120.5
1987 149.7 2,346.0
1988 155.2 2,601.1
1989 152.6 2,867.8
1990 221.0 3,206.3
1991 269.2 3,598.2
1992 290.3 4,001.8
1993 255.1 4,351.0
1994 203.2 4,643.3
1995 164.0 4,920.6
1996 107.4 5,181.5
1997 21.9 5,369.2
1998 (69.3) 5,478.2 Clinton "Surpluses", but federal debt grows $400Bn…hmmm
1999 (125.6) 5,605.5
2000 (236.2) 5,628.7
2001 (128.2) 5,769.9
2002 157.8 6,198.4
2003 377.6 6,760.0
2004 412.7 7,354.7
2005 318.4 7,905.3
2006 248.2 8,451.4
2007 160.7 8,950.8
2008 458.6 9,986.1
2009 1,412.7 11,875.9
2010 1,294.4 13,528.8
2011 1,299.6 14,764.2
2012 1,087.0 16,050.9
2013 679.6 16,719.4
2014 484.6 17,794.5
2015 438.4 18,120.1 Federal Debt grows $1.4Tn…hmmm
2016 587.4 19,537.4



Wednesday, October 19, 2016

Checking in on an old friend

Courtesy of The Real Deal:

“Jonathan Gray thinks people are getting too worked up about interest rates.

“There’s a (false) sense that owning real estate is the same as owning a bond,” Blackstone Group’s real estate head said in an interview on CNBC Tuesday. “Real estate, like stocks, can see earnings growth. And that’s what we’re seeing today because of favorable fundamentals.”

As the Federal Reserve readies itself to raise short-term rates later this year, many in the real estate industry worry that higher short-term rates could spill over into higher long-term rates, which could increase the cost of financing and put downward pressure on property prices.

But Gray argued that rising rates don’t have to be bad for the real estate market since they tend to coincide with improving fundamentals – such as employment and income. He pointed out that the real estate market “did OK” in previous eras of rising rates.

“We don’t expect to see the growth in value in the next couple years that we’ve seen in the last four or five years,” he admitted. “But we don’t expect to see some sort of sharp decline in the near term.””

It’s worth paying attention to the guys at Blackstone, as they are the biggest of the big in institutional real estate. And his logic about real estate having an ability to increase rents does distinguish it from bonds. BUT…we are dealing in unchartered territory when it comes to central bank policy, and part of what has driven recent pricing in real estate is the interest rate environment that we live in. As such, many folks have increased their allocation to the space because of its financialization and as an expression of an alternative to traditional fixed income. So, Gray may be right, but there is a lot more going on that muddies the waters in terms of what comes next.

Monday, July 11, 2016

Narratives

Ben Hunt:

The only rational owner of a negative rate bond is a pure return seeker; there are zero income seekers holding negative rate bonds. Why is this a problem? Because income seekers will continue to own bonds even if the price goes down (for a while, anyway; at the very least, they are sticky owners). Return seekers, on the other hand, are not sticky owners at all. They will only own a bond if they think that the price is going up — meaning in this case that yields will continue to become even more negative, i.e., that there’s a greater fool (probably in the form of a Central Bank) willing to pay higher and higher prices for these income-destroying bonds — and they will sell in a heartbeat if they think this dynamic is changing.

There is, to cop a phrase from the People’s Bank of China, a massive “one-way bet” on negative rate sovereign debt today. The momentum trade has crystallized to perfection in negative rate bonds, which has grown to become a $10+ trillion (yes, that’s trillion with a T) asset class. I think it’s the most crowded trade in the world from a behavioral or investment DNA perspective, and the moment you get even a whiff of the ECB or BOJ backing down from or reaching its limit of greater foolishness, you are going to get a rush to the exit on ALL sovereign bonds that will shake global capital markets to their core. It’ll be good times till then, as it always is, and I am seeing zero signs of Central Bankers backing down from their greater foolishness. But we have once again set up the global financial system as an inverted pyramid, with a $10 trillion asset class poised on a single, solitary piece of Common Knowledge —– what everyone knows that everyone knows. In 2008, the $10 trillion asset class of residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) was entirely based on the Common Knowledge that it was impossible to have a nationwide decline in U.S. home prices. When that Narrative failed, the entire inverted pyramid came crashing down. In 2016, the $10 trillion asset class of negative rate sovereign bonds is entirely based on the Common Knowledge that there is no limit to the greater foolishness of Central Banks. If this Narrative fails, the entire inverted pyramid will come crashing down again.

Monday, April 11, 2016

What the end looks like...

In the context of the typical question "How can the Fed ever lose control of the bond market, since they can always print more money?", today's Ask Fleck had a submission that probably spells out the answer...

Specifically, there is a quote in the most recent Barron's from Bill Gross:

"Years of easing by central banks mean that interest rates in most of the developed world will fluctuate narrowly. That offers an opportunity to sell volatility to create return. If you bought a 10-year Treasury bond today and nothing changed, you would get a 1.9% yield. If you bought a seven-year German Bund, you’d get zero. If, however, you sold a three-month call or three-month put on that same Treasury with a 20-basis-point [hundredths of a percentage point] variation—in other words, the yield stayed in the range of 1.7%-2.1% for three months—the trade would produce an annual return of 6%, as opposed to 1.9%.

The risk is that interest rates will go up or down by more than 20 basis points over a three-month period. But my premise is that central bankers will do anything possible to contain interest-rate fluctuations. The sale of volatility is producing the predominant amount of return in my fund."

The reader goes on to suggest (reasonably) that if Gross is pursuing this strategy, then plenty of other money managers are as well.  Which leads to his pertinent insight:

"You've been asked over the years how the fed could ever not control the outcome in the bond market (in so many words). After all, can't they just print money and buy bonds? Well, trillions upon trillions of notional bond money, leveraged and selling volatility on top of it? That's how - they will be totally overcome when the time comes as these managers are forced to deal with portfolio problems all at the same time. Again, it's not today's business, treasury bond yield will likely move lower, perhaps much lower, during a nasty equity bear market (see Europe and Japan). But that would likely reinforce this behavior in the bond market of selling vol on leverage. If ever there were a coiled spring the Fed would be unable to deal with this is it..."

Friday, March 18, 2016

Sigh

Courtesy of Jesse:

"The main thing is that the debt is in dollars. So we can't run out of cash--we print the stuff. Suppose that foreigners decide we're not reliable.   How does that drive up interest rates?   The Fed controls short-term interest rates, and long-term interest rates reflect expected short rates. How's that supposed to happen?"

-Paul Krugman

I take exception to the notion that the Fed, or any other central bank, is bigger than the market.  If that were really true, then why do we see so many results/recessions/busts that run counter to their agendas and policy plans?

But, more than that, if we look at the broader implications of his comment, do the problems end simply with where rates are?  In fact, if the Fed has to print endless amounts of money to battle bond sellers, foreign and domestic, what happens to the dollar?  There are so many possible knock-on effects that are troubling, that the sheer academic arrogance in his comment is astounding.

Wednesday, January 1, 2014

2014

I had to go back and remind myself of the quick list of predictions that I made for 2013. Overall, not a stellar job. Gold is still in a bull market, but it also suffered horribly over the last 12 months. Japan showed the early signs of what I deem to be big problems, but there was no obvious combustion. There was a taper, despite my best guess, and the unemployment rate moved lower (even if everyone now knows it is a bad measure of success). But, shorting the yen was definitely a winner.

On to 2014…

I think the same themes that I focused on then are in play. We have just moved 12 months closer to the point when everyone else will start to realize it.

-Japan keeps approving more “stimulus” because Abenomics does not do anything except weaken the yen and create cost-push inflation. Wages are stagnant.

-Gold has tested the 2013 low a few times. We’ll know shortly, I think, whether that will hold or $1,000 to $1,100 is the landing spot. Either way, a good value exists in the metal and the better mining stocks. Still,  I anticipate that 2014 will be much more generous to the gold bulls than the past two years have been.

-The 10-year closed above 3.00%. That can’t make the Fed happy and is a clear measure of how the bond market is no longer cooperating. Higher rates are bad for housing prices, the stock market, budget deficits, profit margins and all the things that create a desired wealth effect.  So, with all of it, I don’t think the Taper is the thing.

-Finally, on a personal note, I expect my endeavors in real estate to evolve.

A happy and healthy new year to all.

Friday, December 20, 2013

Links

I think Alasdair Macleod provides an interesting take on the taper announcement. To wit:

-The reduction was a token amount and the fact that it sliced away at MBS and Treasuries equally suggests that the decision was one to “pluck a figure out of the air”

-Even if the QE policy was reduced in scope, the commitment to ZIRP remains. And, therefore, implicitly a commitment to providing as much liquidity as needed to keep rates suppressed. Doesn’t that make the two policy announcements a bit contradictory? Or, better yet, QE meaningless in the context of whether or not the Fed must continue to be out in the market buying and selling lots of securities?

Here’s another interesting link – the gold ain’t there.

Speaking of Obamacare, one more requirement has been waved by fiat – namely, the deadline for people who had policies cancelled to sign up or else endure a penalty. This thing is becoming the disaster that keeps on giving. But, the best part is the closing line of a very snarky article: “And the punchline: With only days before the Monday deadline to sign up for coverage that starts Jan. 1, insurers are facing a much smaller, and sicker, pool of customers than hoped for. Like we said: anything that can go wrong... oh look, over there, the Stalingrad & Propaganda 500 just hit a new all time high!”

In Mark Hanson’s latest, he lays to waste the idea that housing is more affordable now than it was during the bubble years since rates are lower and prices are still beneath the highs. The reality is that the exotic financing of yesteryear that allowed people to buy with no money down and no income is gone. Today, the great majority are doing 30-year fixed terms, and the monthly payments are about as high as they have ever been. Factor in at least 20% down, and you should ignore the prior highs on Case-Schiller as to where things could go.

Wednesday, December 18, 2013

The Taper

A few thoughts:

-Even after a $10Bn monthly decrease, the Fed is still on pace to grow its balance sheet by $900Bn per year

-My view is that this move was really a token gesture, so that Bernanke could exit office having done something that resembles prudence

-The reaction of the stock market, to shoot upwards, is only emblematic of the goldilocks crowd, detached from the realities of hard data. Rates went down but then crept back to 2.89%. That trend continues to be up and the disconnect between equities and fixed income will not last indefinitely

-People like to say that QE has not been inflationary, and that all those newly-created reserves just sit at the Federal Reserve doing nothing. If that’s really the case, then why not start to unwind, since they have no impact. But, obviously, their existence has some significance. Clearly, not only can no unwind occur, but it continues to be important to grow the volume of those idle dollars

-Eventually what has been done today will be undone, and in magnitude greater than $10Bn

And, no, I’m not in denial about where things are. I’m just convinced that the majority is.

Monday, November 25, 2013

More Links

In this week’s note from Doug Noland, I think he does a good job of explaining how QE leads to speculation in financial assets – in this instance, U.S. equities:

“As an illustration, follow the trail of outflows from a somewhat less popular “Total Return Bond Fund” (TRBF). To fund outflows, TRBF sells Treasuries to the Federal Reserve. TRBF then transfers Fed liquidity to exiting investors that then use this “money” for investment in the now extremely popular “Total Stock Market Index Fund”. This fund then takes this “money” that originated with the Fed and bids up stock prices.

Or, how about an example where a hedge fund moves to exit an underperforming emerging bond market. Here the fund is unwinding a leveraged “carry trade” that involves selling the EM bond and liquidating the EM currency position. With the EM bonds and currency under intense (“hot money” outflow) pressure, the local EM central bank intervenes with currency purchases (sells dollars to buy the local currency). To fund these purchases, the EM central bank sells Treasuries to the Federal Reserve. The central bank then uses Fed liquidity for purchasing currency from the hedge fund, and the hedge fund then has “money” to rotate into 2013’s speculative vehicle of choice - US equities.”

Then in the latest Hussman piece, he covers a lot of interesting ground related to this overvalued stock market. For example, part of the problem is that many look at the market and think that there is nothing remarkable from a multiples perspective – until one considers that corporate profit margins are 70% above historical norms. All of which means, one, expect some mean reversion, and two, it is not practical to extrapolate from the present on what the discounted value for stocks should be prospectively. That’s why the Schiller P/E is a better multiple to focus on since it measures price to 10-year historical, inflation-adjusted earnings. And it currently stands at a robust 25x.

The other noteworthy point is more of a rebuttal to anyone who tries to tie employment and inflation – essentially the logic behind the Phillips Curve. Here’s Mr. Hussman: “This isn’t to say that A.W. Phillips was incorrect. Rather, his “Phillips Curve” was actually a relationship between the unemployment rate and wage inflation, in a century of British data when Britain was on the gold standard and general prices were stable. What Phillips said, in effect, is that unemployment is inversely related to real wage inflation. That proposition holds true in U.S. data as it does internationally. But it is hardly the basis for any strong belief that we can buy a few more jobs by targeting a higher inflation rate in the general price level.”

Monday, November 18, 2013

And the band plays on...

I think Doug Noland’s (almost) weekly piece is a must-read. This time through he touches on Janet Yellen’s recent confirmation hearings before the Senate, picking up on a very interesting exchange with Senator Bob Corker…

Senator Robert Corker: “We talked a little bit about the Fed in the early summer began to talk about moderating the pace at which it was going to be making purchases. And the market had a pretty stringent reaction. It was like… the Federal Reserve appeared as if it had touched a hot stove and that this policy was going to greatly affect, if you will, the wealth effect that you were trying to create… And so the Fed jumped back. And it seemed to me - and I think you discussed this a little bit in the office - that the Fed had become a prisoner to its own policy. That to really try to step away from QE3 was really going to shatter possibly the markets and therefore take away from the wealth effect. And I wonder if you could talk a little bit about some of the discussions that were taking place during that time.”

Yellen: “Well, Senator, I don’t think that the Fed ever can be or should be a prisoner of the markets…”

Senator Robert Corker: “But to a degree in this case, it did affect the Fed, did it not?”

Yellen: “Well, we do have to take account of what is happening in the markets, what impact market conditions are likely to have on spending and the economic outlook. So it is the case, and we highlighted this in our statement, when we saw a big jump in rates - a jump that was greater than we would have anticipated from the statements that we made in May and June - and particularly saw mortgage interest rates rise in the space of a few months by over a hundred basis points, we had to ask ourselves whether or not that tightening of conditions in a sector where we were seeing a recovery and a recovery that could really - recovery in housing that could drive a broader recovery in the economy - we did have to ask ourselves whether or not that could potentially threaten what we were trying to achieve. But overall, we are not a prisoner of the markets. I continue to feel that we’re seeing an improvement in the labor market, which was the goal of the program. And we will continue to evaluate incoming data and to make decisions on the program in that light going forward.”

Yellen acknowledges that the move up in rates, after hints of a taper, took the Fed by surprise. In other words, they started to lose control and the response was to immediately back off any kind of hawkish stance. And that supports two ideas: (1) that the move in rates was not about an improving economy as the goldilocks crowd tried to suggest; and (2) the Fed’s machinations can never stop unless they are prepared for rates to march much higher.

Friday, October 4, 2013

What vs. Why

The team at Casey Research posted an interesting conversation with a technical analyst, Dominick Graziano. He was the guy who helped them to create the GLD put insurance trades that worked well for their subscribers earlier this year.

In the course of talking about all markets, gold came up of course. His view is that it remains in a significant downtrend – and, therefore, news that should be bullish simply won’t be as impactful versus what might have happened to the price in 2010. He also notes that the charts suggest that global equities entered into a secular bull market earlier this year, one that may last for several more years.

All of which brings me back to the problem that I have with TA. In looking at the “What” of price action, the charts don’t ever give you the full story. As I like to say, Enron’s chart looked great, until it didn’t. And such will be the case, in my opinion, with everything else right now. For example, it seems that there is a huge disconnect between the fundamentals of the underlying economy and stock market performance. There is also the problem of a bull market in bonds that appears to be near completion (if not over already) – and higher interest rates are not going to be good for stocks. And, lastly, if much of the stock market levitation is attributable to money-printing, which I believe, then it’s hard to have any confidence that the trend is secular and still has years to go, especially if people start to figure out how the Fed is trapped in its policies.

The fundamentals matter. Which means the “Why”. And since charts are often looking in the rearview mirror in establishing a trend, they can miss the realities distorted outside of a candlestick.

Broken Money

The subtitle is Why Our Financial System is Failing Us and How We Can Make it Better , and the author is Lyn Alden (2023). I feel like I hav...